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Abstract 
We argue that when discoveries are “sequential” (so that each successive invention builds 
in an essential way on its predecessors) patent protection is not as useful for encouraging 
innovation as in a static setting.  Indeed, society and even inventors themselves may be better off 
without such protection.  Furthermore, an inventor’s prospective profit may actually be enhanced 
by competition and imitation.  Our sequential model of innovation appears to explain evidence 






     1
 
1. Introduction 
  The standard economic rationale for patents is to protect inventors from imitation and 
thereby give them the incentive to incur the cost of innovation.  Conventional wisdom holds that, 
unless would-be competitors are restrained from imitating an invention, the inventor may not 
reap enough profit to cover that cost.  Thus, even if the social benefit of invention exceeds the 
cost, the potential innovator without patent protection may decide against innovating altogether1. 
  Yet interestingly, some of the most innovative industries of the last forty years—
software, computers, and semi-conductors—have historically had weak patent protection and 
have experienced rapid imitation of their products2. Defenders of patents may counter that, had 
stronger intellectual property rights been available, these industries would have been even more 
dynamic.  But we will argue that there is reason to think otherwise. 
  In fact, the software industry in the United States was subjected to a revealing natural 
experiment in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  Through a sequence of court decisions, patent protection 
                                                      
1 This is not the only justification for patents.  Indeed, we will emphasize a different, although related rationale in 
Section 2.  But, together with the spillover benefit that derives from the patent system’s disclosure requirements, it 
constitutes the traditional justification. 
2 Software was routinely excluded from patent protection in the U.S. until a series of court decisions in the mid-
1980’s and 1990’s.  Semiconductor and computer patent enforcement was quite uneven until the organization of the 
Federal Circuit Court in 1982.  Both areas contend with substantial problems of prior art [Aharonian (1992)], and 
some experts argue that up to 90% of semiconductor patents are not truly novel and therefore invalid [Taylor and 
Silbertson (1973)].  These problems make consistent enforcement difficult.  Surveys of managers in semiconductors 
and computers typically report that patents only weakly protect innovation.  Levin et al. (1987) found that patents 
were rated weak at protecting the returns to innovation, far behind the protection gained from lead time and 
learning-curve advantages.  Patents in electronics industries were estimated to increase initiation costs by only 7% 
[Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981)] or 7-15% [Levin et al., (1987)].  Taylor and Silberston (1973) found that 
little R&D was undertaken to exploit patent rights. As one might expect, diffusion and imitation are rampant in 
these industries.  Tilton (1971) estimated the time from initial discovery to commercial imitation in Japanese 
semiconductors to be just over one year in the 1960’s.     2
for computer programs was significantly strengthened.  Evidence suggests that, far from 
unleashing a flurry of new innovative activity, the firms that acquired most of these patents 
actually reduced their R&D spending relative to sales (Bessen and Hunt, 2004).3 
  We maintain, furthermore, that there is nothing paradoxical about this outcome.  For 
industries like software or computers, theory suggests that imitation may promote innovation and 
that strong patents (long-lived patents of broad scope) might actually inhibit it.  Society and even 
the innovating firms themselves could well be served if intellectual property protection were 
more limited in such industries.  Moreover, these firms might genuinely welcome competition 
and the prospect of being imitated4. 
  This is, we argue, because these are industries in which innovation is both sequential and 
complementary.  By “sequential,” we mean that each successive invention builds on the 
preceding one, in the way that the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet built on VisiCalc, and Microsoft’s 
Excel built on Lotus.  And by “complementary,” we mean that each potential innovator takes a 
different research line and thereby enhances the overall probability that a particular goal is 
reached within a given time.  Undoubtedly, the many different approaches taken to voice-
recognition software hastened the availability of commercially viable packages. 
                                                      
3 As Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) show, a similar phenomenon occurred in Japan.  Starting in the late 1980’s, 
the Japanese patent system was significantly strengthened.  However, Sakakibara and Branstetter argue that there 
was no concomitant increase in R&D or innovation. 
 
4 Here are some examples in which firms have appeared to encourage imitation: When IBM announced its first 
personal computer in 1981, Apple Computer, then the industry leader, responded with full-page newspaper ads 
headed, “Welcome, IBM. Seriously.” Adobe put Postscript and PDF format in the public domain, inviting other 
firms to be direct competitors for some Adobe products.  Cisco (and other companies) regularly contribute patented 
technology to industry standards bodies, allowing any entrant to produce competing products.  Finally, IBM and     3
Imitation of a discovery can be socially desirable in a world of sequential and 
complementary innovation because it helps the imitator develop further inventions.  And because 
the imitator may have valuable ideas not available to the original discoverer, the overall pace of 
innovation may thereby be enhanced.  In fact, in a sequential setting, the inventor himself could 
be better off if others imitate and compete against him.  Although imitation reduces the profit 
from his current discovery, it raises the probability of follow-on innovations, which improve his 
future profit. Of course, some form of protection would be essential for promoting innovation, 
even in a sequential setting, if there were no cost to entry and no limit to how quickly imitation 
could take place: in that case, imitators could immediately stream in whenever a new discovery 
was made, driving the inventor’s revenues to zero.  Throughout the paper, however, we assume 
that entry requires investment in specialized capital, human or otherwise.  Alternatively, we 
could assume that even if set-up costs do not deter would-be imitators from entering, entry does 
not occur instantly, and so the original innovator has at least a temporary first-mover advantage. 
The ability of firms to generate positive (although possibly reduced) revenues when imitated 
accords well with empirical evidence for high technology industries.5 
  But whether or not an inventor without patent protection himself gains from being 
imitated, he is more likely (as we will show in one of our main results, Proposition 6) to be able 
to cover his cost of innovation in a sequential than a static environment, provided that it is 
socially desirable for him to incur this cost.  This conclusion weakens the justification for 
                                                                                                                                                                           
several other firms have recently donated a number of patents for free use by open source developers.  The stated 
reason for this donation was to build the overall “ecosystem.” See also Keely (2005). 
5 For example, consider that (1) the software industry is highly segmented (see Mowery 1996), suggesting that 
specialized knowledge prevents a firm that is successful in one segment to move to another and (2) survey data from     4
intellectual property protection, such as patents, in sequential settings.  Indeed, as we establish in 
Proposition 7, patents may actually reduce welfare: by blocking imitation, they may interfere 
with further innovation.  Of course, patent defenders have a counterargument to this criticism: if 
a patent threatens to impede valuable follow-on innovative activity, the patent holder should 
have the incentive to grant licenses to those conducting the activity (thereby allowing innovation 
to occur).  After all, if the follow-on R&D is worthwhile, she could share in its value by a 
suitably chosen licensing fee/royalty, thereby increasing her own profit (or so the argument 
goes).   
A serious problem with this counterargument, however, is that it ignores the likely 
asymmetry between potential innovators in information about future profits.  There is a large 
literature on patent licensing, but to our knowledge it has not addressed this asymmetry.6  In our 
setting, if a patent holder is not as well-informed about a rival’s potential future profits as the 
rival is himself, she may have difficulty setting a mutually profitable license fee, and so, as 
Proposition 7 shows, licensing may fail,7 thereby jeopardizing subsequent innovation (of course, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the electronics and computer industries (see Levin et al. 1987) indicate that “lead-time advantage” and “moving 
down the learning curve quickly” provide more effective protection than patents. 
6 Some papers on patent licensing consider, as we do, the issue of licensing to one’s own competitiors, including 
Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986), Gallini (1984), and Gallini and Winter (1985).  In these papers, however, the social 
loss from failure to license tends to derive from higher costs (because of decreasing returns to scale in monopoly 
production) and high consumer prices, rather than from reduced innovation. 
7 Although this phenomenon does not appear to have been analyzed in the existing patents literature, a closely 
related phenomenon has been examined in the literature on common pool resources such as oil reservoirs.  As 
Wiggins and Libecap (1985) discuss, oil well owners can realize larger total profits if they contract to jointly 
manage production.  But contract negotiations typically involve asymmetric information about future profits.  The 
empirical evidence shows that contracting over oil production typically fails, despite industry-specific regulation 
designed to encourage it.  In one case, only 12 out of 3000 oil fields were completely covered by joint production 
agreements.     5
informational asymmetries about current profits, which we rule out for convenience, would only 
aggravate this problem). 
In short, when innovation is sequential and complementary, standard conclusions about 
patents and imitation may get turned on their heads.  Imitation becomes a spur to innovation, 
whereas strong patents become an impediment. 
Sequential innovation has also been studied by Scotchmer (1991, 1996), Scotchmer and 
Green (1990), Green and Scotchmer (1996), and Chang (1995) for the case of a single follow-on 
innovation. Hunt (2004), O’Donoghue (1998), and O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) 
study a single invention with an infinite sequence of quality improvements. We depart from this 
literature primarily in our model of competition. In our analysis, different firms’ products at any 
given stage differ from one another.8 That is, imitators do not produce direct “knock offs,” but 
rather differentiated products.  This sort of differentiation is widely observed and is, of course, 
the subject of its own literature. But our main point here is that the different R&D paths behind 
these products permit innovative complementarities. Imitation then increases the “bio-diversity” 
of the technology (see footnote 4), improving prospects for future innovation 
We proceed as follows.  In Section 2, we introduce a static (nonsequential) model that, 
we claim, underlies the traditional justification for patents.  We emphasize the point that, besides 
helping an inventor to cover his costs, an important role of patents is to encourage innovative 
activity on the part of others who would otherwise be inclined merely to imitate.  Analytically, 
we show that (i) without patents, the equilibrium level of innovative activity is less than or equal 
                                                      
8 This feature also figures prominently in the models in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) and Tandon (1983).     6
to the optimum, and (ii) with patents, the level is greater than or equal to the optimum 
(Proposition 1).  Despite the potential welfare ambiguity this result suggests, we argue that, on 
balance, patents are better than no patents: provided that the upper tail of the distribution of 
innovation values is sufficiently thick (which, we argue, is the empirically relevant case), 
expected welfare with patent protection exceeds that without it (Proposition 2).  Not surprisingly, 
inventors themselves are also better off with patent protection (Proposition 3).  We also note 
that, in this static model, competition unambiguously diminishes the payoff of a prospective 
inventor (Proposition 4). 
In Section 3, we modify the model to accommodate a potentially infinite sequence of 
inventions, each building on its predecessor.  Because R&D now serves to raise the probability 
not only of the current invention but of future ones too, the equilibrium level of R&D will 
generally be higher than in the static model.  However we show that the equilibrium level of 
innovative activity when there is no patent protection is still generally less than the optimum 
(Proposition 5).  Even so, we establish that the gap between the equilibrium level and the 
optimal level is smaller than in the static model.  Thus, equilibrium without patents is more 
nearly optimal with sequential than with static innovation (Proposition 6), implying that the case 
for intellectual property protection is correspondingly weaker.  Indeed, under the same 
hypotheses for which we derived the opposite conclusion in the static model, the levels of social 
welfare and innovation when there is patent protection are actually lower on average than when 
there is not, (Proposition 7).  Finally, we establish that, under somewhat more stringent 
assumptions, inventors themselves benefit from the absence of patent protection (Proposition 8) 
and may actually gain from being imitated, whether or not there is patent protection (Proposition 
9), again in contrast to the static model.  Most proofs are relegated to Appendix B.     7
2. The Static Model 
We consider an industry consisting of two (ex ante symmetric) firms9.  Each firm 
chooses whether or not to undertake R&D10 to discover and develop an invention with (social) 
value v,11 where v is known publicly and drawn ex ante from distribution with  () c.d.f. F v .  We 
suppose that a firm’s cost C of R&D is a random variable: with probability q, C = c, and with 
probability 1 – q, C = 0.12  A firm learns the realization of C before it decides whether to 
undertake R&D, but this information is private.  Realizations are (statistically) independent 
across the two firms. 
If a single firm undertakes R&D, the probability of successful innovation is  1 p .13  If both 
firms do R&D, the probability that at least one of them will succeed is  2 p .  We model the idea of 
complementarity—that having different firms pursue the same technological goal raises the 
probability that someone will succeed—by supposing that  21 p p > ; each firm’s probability of 
                                                      
9 Limiting the model to two firms in particular is a matter only of expositional convenience; all our results extend to 
any other finite number of firms.  However, by assuming the number of firms is finite, we are implicitly supposing 
that there is a limit on how many firms are able to imitate a given invention, implying that an innovator’s revenue 
need not be driven to zero in equilibrium.  As we note above (and in footnote 5), we could alternatively assume that 
imitation takes time.  Either way, it is important for our argument that, even without patent protection, the inventor 
be able to obtain some revenue from an invention. 
10 Throughout this paper, a firm’s R&D decision is a binary choice: to do it or not to do it.  But all our results 
generalize to the case where the firm can vary the intensity of its R&D effort. 
11 There is no additional social value that accrues if both firms discover the innovation. 
12 We have chosen the smaller realization to be zero merely for analytic convenience; all our results hold with a 
positive lower cost. 
13 Our framework in this section is static, but if it were viewed as the reduced form of a dynamic setting, then  1 p  
could alternatively be interpreted as the discount factor corresponding to the time lag to innovation.     8
success is only  1 p ,14 but because their research strategies are not perfectly positively correlated, 
the overall probability of success is higher.  Of course, we must also have  21 2 p p < , i.e.,  
(1)      12 1 2 p pp << , 
because, at best, the two firms’ research strategies will be perfectly negatively correlated (in 
which case,  21 2 p p = ). 
  We first consider the socially efficient R&D decisions for the two firms, i.e., the 
decisions that a planner maximizing social welfare would direct them to take.  Actually, because 
we suppose that R&D costs are private information, the notion of social efficiency is not 
completely unambiguous.  One possibility entails the planner first having the firms report their 
costs to him and then issuing them with R&D directives based on these costs.  Another—more 
constrained—concept posits that the planner is unable to collect cost information, in which case 
the best he can do is to give each firm a conditional directive, e.g., “Do R&D if your cost C = 0 
but not if C = c.”15  As we will see, the latter notion makes comparisons with market equilibrium 
easier, and so we will adopt it henceforth. 
  Clearly, the planner will direct each firm to undertake R&D if its cost is zero.  However, 
despite the complementarity in different R&D lines, the value of v may not be high enough to 
warrant the two firms each undertaking R&D if their costs are both c.  Thus, in that case, the 
                                                      
14 That is, we rule out externalities in which one firm’s R&D raises the other’s chance of success.  Of course, such 
spill-overs are interesting and, in practice, important.  But here they would serve only to strengthen our findings. 
15 An alternative interpretation of this notion of constrained efficiency is that there is a separate planner for each 
firm and that the planners cannot communicate or coordinate with each other.  Under this interpretation, their 
welfare-maximizing directives will constitute a “social Nash optimum” (see Grossman 1977).     9
planner will want to treat the firms asymmetrically (even though they are inherently identical).  
That is, it will designate one of them, say firm 1, as the “aggressive” firm and have it undertake 
R&D with C = c as soon as v exceeds some threshold  1 v
∗.  Firm 2, however, will be directed not 
to undertake R&D with C = c unless v is bigger than a higher threshold  () 21 vv
∗ ∗ > .16 See Figure 1 
for a diagram of the various thresholds discussed in this section. 
 To  calculate  1 v
∗, note that if firm 2’s cost is c (which occurs with probability q)—so that, 
if v is only slightly bigger than  1 v
∗, firm 2 will not undertake R&D—then the gross expected 
social value of R&D by firm 1 is  1 p v, whereas if firm 2’s cost is 0 (which occurs with 
probability 1 – q)—implying that firm 2 will do R&D—the gross expected marginal contribution 
of firm 1’s R&D is () 21 p pv − .  Hence, the expected net value of firm 1’s R&D is 
() ( ) () 12 1 1 qp q p p v c +− − − , and so 
   () ( ) 12 1 1 10 , qp q p p v c
∗ +− − −= 
i.e., 










Similarly, we have 
   () 21 2 0, pp vc
∗ −− =  
                                                      
16 If we adopt the two-planner interpretation (see footnote 15), there are three social Nash optima (SNOs): one in     10
i.e., 







      . 
Turning from this normative analysis, we next examine the nature of equilibrium when 
the invention in question can be patented.  We suppose that a firm with a patent can capture the 
full social benefit v of the invention.17  If both firms undertake R&D, each has a probability  1
2 2 p  
of getting the patent.18   
Corresponding to the three possible social Nash optima of the efficiency analysis (see 
footnote 15), there are three possible equilibria when the invention is patentable: (i) one in which 
firm 1 is aggressive and firm 2 is passive, (ii) the mirror image, in which the firms’ roles are 
reversed, and (iii) a symmetric equilibrium in which, for a range of values of v, the firms both 
randomize between doing and not doing R&D.  For comparison with the planner’s problem, we 
will focus on (i), which is strictly more efficient than (iii) (of course, we could just as easily have 
concentrated on (ii)). 
                                                                                                                                                                           
which firm 1 is aggressive, a second in which firm 2 is aggressive, and a third (but less efficient) SNO in which the 
two firms are treated symmetrically: for a range of v, each firm randomizes between doing and not doing R&D. 
17 This, of course, is a strong assumption.  However, the incentive failures and monopoly inefficiencies that arise 
when it is not imposed are already well understood.  The assumption is a simple way to abstract from these familiar 
distortions.  It also accords with our approach of making suppositions favorable to patenting in order to draw 
stronger conclusions about patents’ failures in section 3. 
 
18 The total probability of discovery is  2 p , and each firm has a one-half chance of making it first.  This gets at the 
idea that patents have breadth (so that a patent holder can block the implementation of other firms’ discoveries that 
are similar, but not identical, to its own).  That is, only one firm can get a patent.     11
  In equilibrium (i), each firm will undertake R&D if its cost is zero - - it has nothing to 
lose by doing so.  If v is not too big, then, from firm 1’s point of view, the probability that the 
other firm does R&D is 1 – q and the probability that it does not is q.  Hence, firm 1 will 
undertake R&D with C = c if its expected revenue  ( ) ( )
1
12 2 1 qp q p v +−  exceeds its cost c, i.e., if 
1 vv
∗∗ > , where 
    () ()
1
12 1 2 10 , qp q p v c
∗∗ +− − =  
or 










  As for firm 2, it will not undertake R&D with C = c unless v is sufficiently high for it to 
make a profit even when firm 1 does R&D too.  That is, v must exceed  2 v
∗∗, where 
     1
22 2 0 pv c
∗∗ − = , 
or 





∗∗ = . 
  Finally, we investigate the nature of equilibrium when there is no patent protection.  We 
assume that, without patents, if either firm is successful in making the discovery, the other can     12
imitate costlessly19 and that competition then drives each firm’s gross revenue down to a 
fraction  ()
1
2 0 ss <≤  of the total value v.20 
  Once again, there are three possible equilibria, and, as before, we will concentrate on the 
one in which firm 1 is aggressive and firm 2 is passive.  In this equilibrium, either firm will 
undertake R&D if its cost is zero.  Firm 1 will undertake R&D with C = c if  1 vv
∗∗∗ > , where 
   () ( ) () 12 1 1 10 qsp q s p p v c
∗∗∗ +− − −=, 
i.e., 










Comparing (2) with (6), we see that  11 vv
∗ ∗∗∗ < .  This inequality corresponds to the classic 
incentive failure that the patent system is meant to address.  When  11 vv v
∗ ∗∗∗ << , firm 1 cannot 
make a profit on its R&D investment without protection from imitation, despite the fact that such 
investment would be socially beneficial.  A patent solves this problem by proscribing imitation.  
From (1),  1
22 1 2 p pp >− , and so from (2) and (4),  11 vv
∗∗∗ < .  Hence, with the prospect of patent 
                                                      
19 In reality, even imitations that are complete knock-offs may involve substantial expenses, but our assumption 
gets at the idea that such expenses will typically be dwarfed by the innovating firm’s R&D costs.  Of course, some 
inventions are so difficult to reverse engineer that trade secrecy adequately protects against imitation.  But such 
inventions are not likely to be patented anyway, even if they could be, because of the patent system’s disclosure 
requirements.  To study potential shortcomings of the patent system, our focus in this paper is on innovations that 
inventors would choose to patent if offered the opportunity. 
20 By assuming symmetry here, we simplify the computations a bit but, perhaps more importantly, we are 
strengthening the case for patents (if instead the innovating firm got the lion’s share of the profit from the 
discovery, then safeguarding intellectual property would not matter as much).  This will bolster our argument in 
section 3, where we point out why patent protection may be socially undesirable.     13
protection, firm 1 will be willing to undertake R&D investment, provided this is socially 
worthwhile. 
  But even in a setting where  1 vv
∗∗∗ > —so that R&D is profitable despite 
imitation—patents may well serve a useful purpose.  This is because they can encourage several 
firms to go after the same innovation, which may be beneficial because of complementarity.  In 
the absence of patent protection, firm 2 will earn expected profit 
(7)       2 sp v c − , 
if it decides to undertake R&D like firm 1.  If, instead, it sits back and waits to imitate firm 1’s 
invention, it can expect profit 
(8)       1 sp v . 
Hence, in equilibrium, it will invest in R&D only if (7) exceeds (8), i.e., if  2 vv
∗∗∗ > , where 
     () 21 2 0, sp pv c
∗∗∗ −− =  
or 










But  22 vv
∗ ∗∗∗ < , and so if v lies between  22 and  vv
∗ ∗∗∗, we again have an incentive failure: although 
firm 1 will undertake R&D, firm 2 will merely imitate, despite the net social benefit from its 
investing too.     14
Here again patents come to the rescue.  With the prospect of patent protection, firm 2 will 
undertake R&D provided that  2 vv
∗∗ > .  So, from (1), (2) and (5), it will undertake R&D if such 
investment is socially desirable. 
Patents, therefore, accomplish more than merely protecting inventors from imitation; they 
encourage would-be imitators to invest in innovation themselves.  Indeed, they create a risk of 
overinvestment in R&D: notice that  1 v
∗∗ is strictly less than  1 v
∗, and  2 v
∗∗ is strictly less than  2 v
∗.21 
Overinvestment can come about because when a firm decides to undertake R&D, it increases the 
probability that the discovery will be made, but also diminishes the other firm’s chances of 
getting a patent  Because it doesn’t take this negative externality into account, it is overly 
inclined to undertake R&D. 
  We summarize these results with: 
Proposition 1:  In the static model, the equilibrium level of R&D investment without 
patents is less than or equal to the social optimum.  By contrast, the equilibrium level of R&D 
investment with patent protection is greater than or equal to the social optimum.   
Proof:  As we have noted, the first claim follows because  11 vv
∗ ∗∗∗ <  and  22 vv
∗∗ ∗ ∗ < .  The 
second follows because  11 vv
∗∗ ∗ <  and  22 vv
∗∗∗ < . 
  Observe that the possible overinvestment in R&D induced by patents could, in principle, 
be avoided if there were no complementarities of research across firms.  Specifically, one could 
                                                      
21 The possibility that patents can give rise to excessive spending on R&D is well known from the patent-race 
literature; see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Loury (1979).     15
imagine awarding a firm an “ex ante patent,” e.g., the right to research and develop a vaccine 
against a particular disease.22  Such protection would, of course, serve to prevent additional 
firms from attempting to develop the invention in question.  But this would be efficient, provided 
that the firm with the patent had the greatest chance for success (which could be ensured, for 
example, by awarding the patent through an auction) and that the other firms would not enhance 
the probability or speed of development, i.e., provided that they conferred no complementarity. 
  But even with the possibility of overinvestment, there is an important sense in which a 
regime with patents may be superior to one without them—if patents serve to encourage R&D 
projects with large returns, then the benefits from these projects can more than offset the welfare 
losses from overinvestment in more marginal projects.  That is, despite potential welfare 
ambiguities, the standard economic doctrine that patents are a “good thing” does follow once we 
suppose the probability of high returns is not too much lower than that of low returns (indeed, 
this is more than just a theoretical hypothesis; see the empirical discussion in footnote 23).  
To make this claim precise, imagine that the social (gross) value of innovation v is drawn 
from a distribution with twice-differentiable c.d.f. F(v) and that, for some  0 k ≥  and  0 v > , the 
following condition holds: 






≥−  for all 
1 ,
c
p vv ∈⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ .   
For v  sufficiently big and k  sufficiently small, this condition ensures that the upper tail of the 
distribution does not fall off too quickly. The Pareto and lognormal distributions, which are 
                                                      
22 Wright (1983) and Shavell and Ypersele (2001) explore similar schemes.     16
commonly found to fit distributions of returns to inventions and patent values in empirical 
research,23 meet this requirement for appropriately chosen parameters.24 (In section 3, we shall 
offer another reason for invoking the Upper Tail Condition.)  We can now state: 
  Proposition 2:  If the Upper Tail Condition holds for v  sufficiently big and k  
sufficiently small, then expected net social welfare in the static model is higher with patent 
protection than without it.[Proof in Appendix B] 
Remark:  Proposition 2 is a formal statement of the economic doctrine favoring the patent system 
that we mentioned above. 
  The proof of Proposition 2 is somewhat involved, but the rough idea behind it is 
straightforward.  To simplify, suppose that  1 q = , i.e., the cost of R&D is c with probability 1.  
Patents will lead to overinvestment—i.e., two firms will invest when one would be more 











Similarly, there will be underinvestment without patents if v satisfies 
                                                      
23 Early survey evidence suggested that the distribution of returns on patented inventions was highly skewed 
(Sanders et al. 1958). Using patent renewal data from Europe, Pakes and Schankerman (1984) found that the values 
of low-value patents could be fit with a Pareto distribution. More recent research has assessed the value of 
inventions in the upper tail by a variety of means and concluded that the distribution is fit well with a Pareto 
distribution function or a truncated lognormal distribution (only the upper tail of the lognormal distribution is 
observed); see Scherer and Harhoff 2000 and Silverberg and Verspagen 2004. 
 
24 This is established in Appendix A.     17
() () 21 11
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, whereas the width of the 




.  Hence, provided that the probability density of v in the 
latter interval is not too much smaller that that in the former (which is ensured by The Upper Tail 
Condition), the gains from patents outweigh the losses. 
Notice that patent licensing brings no advantage to a patent holder in this static model.  
Without licensing, the patent holder obtains a payoff of v.  Were it instead to license the other 
firm, the firms could at best split a total of v.  Thus, even if the patent holder set a license fee 
equal to the other firm’s share of proceeds, it would still end up with at most v. 
25
 
  Similarly, whether or not patent protection is available, a firm does not benefit from 
competition in this model: 
  Proposition 3:  In the static model, a firm undertaking R&D is (weakly) worse off if it 
has a competitor. [Proof in Appendix B] 
  Finally, just as patents are desirable for society in this static model, they are —even more 
clearly—good for the firms themselves: 
                                                      
25 This finding might change if the firms developed complementary innovations that could advantageously be 
cross-licensed; see Fershtman and Kamien (1992).     18
  Proposition 4:  In the static model, a firm undertaking R&D is better off if there is patent 
protection than if there is no such protection. [Proof in Appendix B] 
  Besides rationalizing the patent system, this simple static model captures the basic results 
of patent-race models such as Loury (1979) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980).  It also illustrates 
aspects of static models involving spillover complementarities, such as Spence (1984), who 
emphasizes the socially redundant R&D that can occur under patents.  Our conclusions require 
reassessment, however, once we introduce sequentiality. 
3. Sequential Model 
  Let us now enrich the model to accommodate sequential innovation.  Formally, consider 
an infinite sequence of potential inventions (indexed by  ,... 2 , 1 = t ), each of which has social 
value v 26 drawn from c. d. f. F(v).27  To avoid the complications that arise when a new 
invention renders old discoveries obsolete, we suppose that v constitutes incremental value (i.e., 
an innovation can be thought of as an improvement that enhances the value of the initial 
invention).28   
                                                      
26 Here v is the direct social value of an invention.  In addition, there will be an indirect or option value deriving 
from the fact that the invention makes subsequent innovations possible. 
27 We are assuming that all innovations have the same value, i.e., that v is drawn once and for all from F.  This gets 
at the point that some innovative sequences are very fruitful (high v) and others not as beneficial (low v), i.e., that 
there may be a great deal of correlation between the importance of successive innovations.  But our findings would 
not change qualitatively if instead we supposed that there were independent drawings from F for each successive 
invention.  Indeed, the only change to the formal argument below is to replace the continuation values  1 W  and 
2 W —which, as the argument stands, depend on the once-and-for-all value of v—with their expected values (where 
the expectations are taken with respect to the cdf F). 
28If instead new inventions replaced old ones, an innovation’s social value (or a firm’s profit from the innovation) 
could no longer be represented by a single parameter v but rather would become a sum of flow benefits that begin 
with discovery and end with the innovation’s replacement.  Because the replacement date would itself be     19
  Complementarity between firms arises naturally in this sequential setting when some, but 
not all, of the technical information required for innovation diffuses freely or at low cost. Why 
doesn’t the first inventor always make the subsequent discoveries itself? The usual answer is that 
the second firm possesses specialized information, such as expertise in a particular technology 
(see, for instance, Scotchmer 1991, p. 31).29 If all such information were freely available, the 
first inventor would indeed most likely make the subsequent innovations as well—it would have 
information about its own invention before other firms, and so it would be in the best position to 
make improvements. On the other hand, if the first inventor were able to keep all technical 
information about the innovation secret, then other firms could find making improvements 
extremely difficult, and so again we would expect the first inventor to continue alone.  Of 
course, in reality, neither extreme generally holds.  In a typical scenario, the commercial success 
of an innovative product reveals partial information that is useful to would-be subsequent 
innovators (perhaps because it facilitates reverse engineering), who then apply their own 
particular expertise. For example, Lotus’s success with a spreadsheet that included an integrated 
graphics feature revealed the large commercial importance of such a feature. Even though 
Lotus’s source code remained secret, competitors who had already developed spreadsheet 
products of their own were then able to add integrated graphics without much additional cost. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
endogenous, the analysis of replacement is rather more complex than that of improvement (see Hunt (2004), 
O’Donoghue (1998), and, O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse (1998) for models of replacement in sequential 
innovation).  Although for simplicity, we opt to model innovation as improvement, our major conclusions would not 
change if we invoked replacement instead (see footnote 34).  Furthermore, our assumption of improvement may 
also be more consistent than replacement with technologically differentiated products. 
29 Note that this is the same kind of specialized information that gives rise to innovative complementarity in the 
static model. The presence of such specialized information is consistent with Sutton’s finding (1998) that R&D-
intensive industries that are not highly concentrated are associated with greater heterogeneity.     20
  Consistent with this view, we assume as in the static model that, in a setting without 
patents, firms can costlessly imitate each sequential innovation and that firms incurring the 
investment cost have an equal probability of developing the next innovation (so that the current 
invention’s discoverer has no real advantage). However, we suppose that a patent on an 
invention is sufficiently broad to block the next innovation in the sequence.30 It is sometimes 
argued that, through the disclosure requirement, patents promote diffusion of technical 
information, and our assumptions admittedly neglect this effect.  Still, both empirical evidence 
and theoretical argument call this potential advantage of patents into question (see Machlup and 
Penrose 1950; Bessen 2005).31 
Formally, there are, as before, two firms.  For each invention t, a firm’s cost of R&D is 
either c (with probability q) or zero (with probability 1 q − ).  Costs are independent across firms 
and inventions.  For any t, if just one firm invests in R&D, then, following the static model, the 
probability that innovation t+1 is discovered conditional on the current invention t having 
already been discovered is  1 p  (if invention t has not yet been discovered, then there is no 
chance that innovation t+1 will be developed).  The corresponding conditional probability if 
both firms undertake R&D is  2 p . 
                                                      
30Under patent law, an invention that builds on a patented invention infringes that patent, even if the second 
invention is patentable in its own right (Lemley 1997). 
31 In brief, firms have no motivation to patent inventions that can be maintained as secrets, and so they will patent 
only inventions that would otherwise diffuse rapidly. Indeed, survey evidence finds that firms do not typically use 
patent disclosures as a valuable source of technical information. But in any case, the addition of a reverse-
engineering cost to our model (which would give the patent system an additional advantage) would not overturn our 
qualitative results, provided that that cost were not too large.  Of course, there are many inventions for which the 
reverse-engineering costs are high.  But those are precisely the inventions we would not expect to see patented 
anyway, and so they fall outside the scope of a paper attempting to assess the effect of patents.     21
Just as in the static model, a planner maximizing efficiency will treat the firms 
asymmetrically.  As before, let us assume that firm 1 is the more aggressive of the two.  Then, 
for efficiency, the planner will (i) direct each firm to undertake R&D for a given innovation if its 
cost for that period is zero; and (ii) direct firm 1 to undertake R&D if its cost is c and  1 vv >
  , 
where 
(10)   () () ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 10 qp v c p W q p pv c p pW −+ + − − −+ − =
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and  1 W
  is the expected long-run social payoff when the value of each innovation is  1 v
  and both 
firms invest if their costs are zero but, of the two, only firm 1 invests if its cost is c. 
Equation (10) incorporates the idea that R&D makes possible not only the next invention 
but also innovations after that: if, for example, firm 1 does R&D and firm 2 does not, then there 
is a probability  1 p  that the next invention (worth  1 v
 ) will be discovered and also a probability 
1 p  that the subsequent sequence of innovations (whose expected social value is  1 W
 , if each 
innovation is worth  1 vv =
  ) have a chance of being discovered.  To understand equation (11),     22
note that if only firm 1 invests when C = c, then the terms on the right-hand side led by 
() () ()
2 2,1 , 1 ,  a n d   1 qq q q q q −− −  correspond respectively to the events ( ) 12 ,, Cc Cc ==  
() () 12 12 ,0 , 0 , , Cc C C Cc == ==  and ( ) 12 0, 0 CC = = . 
From (10) and (11), we obtain (see Figure 2 for the dynamic model thresholds) 
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Finally, the planner will (iii) direct firm 2 to undertake R&D if its cost is c and  2 vv >
  , where 
   ()( ) 21 2 21 2 0 pp vcpp W −− + − =
    
    22 2 2 2 2 Wp vq c p W =− +
      












and  2 W
  is the expected long-run social payoff when the value of an innovation is  2 v
  and both 
firms always invest in R&D.  Thus, 
(13)     ( ) () 22 1
2
21






  . 
  Next, we look at behavior in the dynamic model with no patent protection, where we 
continue to focus on the equilibrium in which firm 1 is aggressive and firm 2 passive.  As in the 
static model, if just one firm undertakes R&D then the other firm gets share s of the gross     23
expected profit simply by imitating any invention arising from the investment (without 
necessarily conducting R&D itself).  Clearly, a firm will undertake R&D if its cost is zero.  Firm 
1 will undertake R&D with a cost of c if  1 vv >
  , where 
   () ( )( ) 11 1 1 21 2 1 1 qs p v c p W q s p v c p W −+ + − −+
                 
     () ( ) 11 1 1 1 qs p v p W =− +
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, 
and  1 W
    is firm 1’s expected long-run payoff when the value of an innovation is  1 v
    and each 
firm invests in R&D only when its cost is zero; thus, 
(14)    
()() ()
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       . 
Firm 2 will also undertake R&D with cost c if 
     
2 v v > , where 
   22 2 2 12 1 2 sp v c p W sp v pW −+ = +
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and  2 W
    is firm 2’s expected long-run payoff when the value of each innovation is  1 v
    and both 
firms always invest in R&D; thus, 











    . 
Comparing (12) with (14) and (13) with (15), we see that, as in the static model, there is too little 
R&D in equilibrium relative to efficiency: 
Proposition 5: In the sequential model, the equilibrium level of R&D investment in a regime 
without patents is less than or equal to the social optimum. 
Proof:  From (12) and (14),  11 vv >
       From (13) and (15) and because  1
2 s <   22 vv >
      . 
  Q.E.D. 
  Although equilibrium without patents remains inefficient in the dynamic model, there is 
an important sense in which the inefficiency is smaller than that in the static model.  To begin 
with, notice, from (6) and (14), that  11 vv
∗∗∗ <
     and, from (9) and (15), that  22 vv
∗∗∗ <
    .  That is, the 
expected equilibrium levels of R&D in the dynamic model are higher than those in the static 
model (as we would anticipate since, in the sequential setting, investing in R&D raises the 
probability not only of the next innovation but of subsequent innovation). 
  Still, the fact that there is more R&D in the dynamic model does not by itself settle the 
matter that the dynamic equilibrium is more efficient.  After all, efficiency also entails a higher 
expected level of R&D in the sequential than the static model: from (2) and (12),  11 vv
∗ <
  , and,     25
from (3) and (13)  22 vv
∗ <
  .  Nevertheless, under the same hypothesis invoked to show that patents 
are more efficient than no patents in the static model (Proposition 2), we can show that 
equilibrium without patents is more nearly efficient in the sequential than the static model: 
Proposition 6:  If the Upper Tail Condition holds for v  sufficiently big and k sufficiently small, 
then the likelihood of inefficiency in the sequential model without patents is lower than that in 
the static model without patents. [Proof in Appendix B] 
To get a feel for why Proposition 6 holds, notice that the probability that firm 1’s 
behavior is inefficient in the static-model equilibrium without patents is the probability that 
11 , vv v
∗∗ ∗ ∗ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ , whereas the corresponding probability in the dynamic-model equilibrium without 
patents is the probability that  11 , vv v ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦
      .  But the interval  11 , vv ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦
       is smaller than  11 , vv
∗ ∗∗∗ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , 
and the former also lies below the latter.  Hence if the density of  ( ) F v  does not drop off too 
rapidly as v increases, the probability that  11 , vv v ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦
       is smaller than the probability that 
11 , vv v
∗∗ ∗ ∗ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ .  The argument is similar—although slightly more complicated—for firm 2.  
Equilibrium with patents is more complicated in the dynamic than the static model.  To 
begin with, when the model is dynamic, we must, distinguish between the R&D behavior of the 
two firms before a patent is obtained on the first invention and their behavior after this patent is 
obtained (in the static model, by contrast, there is obviously no R&D after the patent is 
obtained).  Furthermore, we have to consider the levels at which patent holders will set license 
fees, an issue that also does not arise in the static model.     26
As we have done all along, we shall focus on the equilibrium in which firm 1 is 
aggressive and firm 2 is passive.  If inventions are protected by patents, each firm will invest if 
its cost is zero and neither firm yet has a patent.  A firm will also invest if its cost is zero and it 
has a patent.  If neither firm yet has a patent, firm 1 will invest if its cost is c and 
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and  .5 W
   is the expected long-run payoff of a firm that holds a patent when the value of an 
innovation is  .5 v
  , if it conducts R&D only when its cost is zero and licenses the other firm only 
when that firm’s cost is zero, i.e., it sets the license fee so high that only a low-cost firm will 
accept.  More specifically, when only a low-cost firm is licensed, it is optimal for the patent 
holder to set the fee at a level equal to the additional expected surplus that the firm would 
generate from the next innovation by undertaking R&D.  In this way, the patent holder gets the 
entire joint profit for itself.32  This outcome is reflected in formula (17): note that 
       
5 . 2
2
5 . 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 v p q v p q q − + −  is the total expected surplus generated when each firm does R&D if 
and only if its cost is zero.  From (16) and (17), we have 
                                                      
32 Implicit in this conclusion is the assumption that the patent holder has all the bargaining power in setting the 
license fee.  But if we assumed instead that the other firm shares in the bargaining power, none of our qualitative 
conclusions would change.     27















   . 
  If neither firm yet has a patent, firm 2 will also invest in R&D when its cost is c, if 
   
75 . v v > , where 
    ()
1
2. 7 5 . 7 5 2 0 pv W c +− =
      , 









qq p q p v
W





   , 
and  .75 W
    is the expected long-run payoff of a patent holder, when the value of an innovation is 
.75 v
   , if it conducts R&D only when its cost is zero and licenses the other firm only when that 












   . 
  A firm with a patent will invest in R&D with a cost of c (as opposed to just licensing) if 
1.5 vv >
   , where 
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and  1.5 W
   is the expected long-run payoff of a patent holder when the value of each innovation is 
1.5 v
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   . 
Notice, from (19) and (20), that we have presumed that the v-threshold at which firm 2 with cost 
c does R&D when neither firm has a patent is less than that at which a firm with a patent does 
R&D when its cost is c.  However, it is readily verified that (19) is indeed less than (20) 
provided that q is sufficiently small - - and the latter is a hypothesis of the propositions we are 
coming to. 
  A firm with a patent will license the other firm (and perform R&D itself) even if that 
other firm’s cost is c provided that  2 vv >
  , where 
(21)   ( ) ( ) ( ) c W v p q W v p q c W v p − + − + + = − +
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and  2 W
   is the expected long-run payoff of a patent holder, when the value of each innovation is 
2 v
  , if it always invests in R&D and always licenses the other firm.  By licensing the other firm 
even in the event that it has a high cost of R&D, the patent holder raises the probability of 
discovery from  1 p  to  2 p  in that event, but must reduce its license fee by c (and, because costs 
are private information, it must do so even when the other firm’s cost is low).33  From (21) and 
(22), we have 









−+ − − −
=
−
   . 
Once again, we have presumed the ranking of threshold values: implicit in (20) and (23) is the 
presumption that  1.5 2 vv <
     .  That this is indeed the case is easily shown as long as q is 
sufficiently small, which the following result assumes: 
Proposition 7: If the Upper Tail Condition holds for v  sufficiently big and k sufficiently small, 
then there exists  0 q >  such that expected net social welfare in the dynamic model is higher in 
equilibrium without patent protection than in equilibrium with such protection provided that 
qq < . [Proof in Appendix B] 
                                                      
33 We have been assuming implicitly that a firm wishing to build on a patented invention must first obtain a license 
from the patent holder.  But let us imagine that the firm instead goes ahead and attempts to develop the next 
innovation without a license.  If taking this next step entails first marketing some imitation of the patented item, then 
the firm can expect to be sued for patent infringement and so presumably will not proceed in this way.  But suppose 
that it can potentially move to the next generation without direct market experience in the current generation.  In 
that case, if it is successful, it can apply for a license ex post (see Scotchmer 1996 and chapter 5 of Scotchmer 2005 
for treatments of ex post licensing).  Notice, however, that the patent holder will then set a license fee that 
appropriates all of the firm’s profit from its invention.  Furthermore, in contrast to ex ante licensing, the patent 
holder will not reduce this fee by c, even if that was the firm’s R&D cost, because this expenditure has already been 
sunk.  Thus, a firm with R&D cost c will do worse by waiting for ex post licensing (the analysis would be a bit more 
involved if the firm had some bargaining power in determining the license fee, but as footnote 32 points out, our 
qualitative conclusions would remain the same.)     30
Remark: Note that this result holds even for small, but positive values of s, that is, even with 
substantial dissipation of rents in the no-patent case. Moreover, one can show that it does not 
depend on the assumption that the development cost for a low-cost type is zero; it holds for a 
positive lower cost as well. Finally, notice that we have considered private information only 
regarding development costs. But because rivals are presumably using different technologies, 
private information about production costs is also likely. This would lead to a broader range of 
circumstances in which patents would generate lower social welfare. 
  To get a feel for why Proposition 7 holds, let us suppose that higher values of v are 
sufficiently more likely than lower values (which is much stronger than the actual hypothesis).  
If there is no patent protection, firm 2 will undertake R&D with cost c as long as the marginal 
benefit () () 21 p ps v W −+  exceeds the cost c, where W is firm 2’s continuation payoff after the 
current invention.  Thus, as a crude lower threshold, firm 2 will do R&D if 








    . 
In a regime with patent protection, by contrast, once one firm has a patent, it will refrain from 
setting the license fee low enough so that the other firm will undertake R&D with cost c, if the 
patent holder’s expected benefit from the additional R&D  ( )( ) 21 qp p vW −+  is less than the 
loss in fee revenue c from setting the lower fee, i.e., if 
() ∗∗      () ( ) 21 , qp p vW c −+ <  
where W is the patent holder’s continuation payoff after the current innovation.  Now, for each 
subsequent innovation, the expected gross benefit to the patent holder of both firms’ doing R&D     31
is  2 p v , but from this we must subtract the patent holder’s expected R&D cost qc and the 
reduction in the license fee c.  Thus, 
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But if q is small, then the right-hand side of ( ) ∗∗∗  exceeds the right-hand side of () ∗ .  Thus, for 
22 , vv v ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦
       , society gets more R&D investment when there is no patent protection than when 
such protection is available.  And since there is underinvestment anyway in the absence of patent 
protection, this additional R&D is socially beneficial, i.e., for this interval, “no patents” are 
better than “patents.”  Now, of course, for lower values of v, the comparison can go the other 
way.  But if higher values are sufficiently more likely than lower values, we can conclude that 
having no patent protection is better on average. 
  This conclusion takes into account the overall effect of patents on R&D.  If we focus 
purely on the incentives of firms to undertake R&D before a patent has been obtained, we see 
from (12) and (23) that firms will tend to overinvest, as in the static model (see Proposition 1).  
Hence, under the very condition that makes the case for patents compelling in the static model, 
our analysis shows that this overinvestment effect is more than counterbalanced in the dynamic     32
model by the constraint on R&D imposed by the patent holder’s unwillingness to license a high-
cost firm. 
 If  1
2 s ≈  —so that there is little profit dissipation—then most of the net social welfare 
generated without patents accrues to the firms themselves.  Hence, in that case, we can conclude 
that ex ante the firms themselves will prefer that innovations not be protected by patents: 
Proposition 8: If the Upper Tail Condition holds for v  sufficiently big and k sufficiently small, 
then each firm’s ex ante expected profit in the dynamic model is higher in equilibrium without 
patent protection than in equilibrium with protection, provided that q is sufficiently small and s 
is near enough 1
2 .  [Proof in Appendix B] 
Remark: The conclusion of Proposition 8 depends critically on neither firm having a patent ex 
ante.  It is evident that once a firm obtains such protection, it will definitely prefer to keep it. 
  Finally, we turn to a fourth important difference between the static and sequential 
models: whether or not an innovating firm itself benefits from competition and being imitated.  
In Proposition 3, we showed that a firm undertaking R&D clearly loses from competition and 
imitation in the static model.  By contrast, in the sequential model we have: 
Proposition 9:  Assume that the Upper Tail Condition holds forv  sufficiently big and k 
sufficiently small and that 
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If s is near enough  1
2 , then in the sequential model a firm gains from having a competitor and 
being imitated, whether or not there is patent protection. [Proof in Appendix B] 
Remark 1:  Proposition 9 is a formal justification for the dictum that “competition expands the 
market” and explains Apple’s welcoming greeting to IBM (see footnote 4). 
Remark 2:  Condition (24) holds if, for example,  1 p p = and  ( )
2
2 11 , p p =− −  i.e., if the two 
firms’ chances of success are statistically independent. 
Remark 3:  Propositions 6 – 9 suggest another reason beyond empirical realism for invoking the 
Upper Tail Condition.34  As we noted in section 2, the welfare comparison between the patent 
and no-patent regimes is ambiguous in the absence of any assumption about the distribution of 
returns: the absence of patents leads to underinvestment in R&D, but, in the static model, patents 
induce overinvestment.  Because something like the Upper Tail Condition is needed to generate 
the standard conclusion that, on balance, patents are desirable in a static setting, it is of interest 
to see that this same condition invoked in a sequential setting leads to quite different results: the 
no-patent regime is now closer to efficiency than in the static model; patents may generate less 
innovation than in the absence of patents; and imitation may be welcomed by inventors 
themselves. 
Having a competitor may be advantageous to a would-be inventor because, for v big 
enough (which, given the Upper Tail Condition, is sufficiently likely), this other firm will 
                                                      
34 We have established these propositions under the hypothesis that new inventions enhance rather than replace old 
inventions, but notice that the contrast between the static and dynamic models—on which Proposition 6 turns—and 
the unwillingness of a patent holder to license high-cost competitors—on which Propositions 7-9 turn—do not 
depend on this distinction. Hence, the propositions continue to hold for replacement.     34
undertake R&D too and thereby raise the probability of discovery from  12  to  p p , which 
improves the inventor’s future profit.  Of course, there is also the drawback that the competitor 
obtains a share of this profit.  But if s is not too small, this latter effect is outweighed by the 
former. 
Conclusion 
Intellectual property appears to be an area in which results that seem secure in a static 
model may be overturned in a sequential setting. The prospect of being imitated inhibits 
inventors in a static world; in a dynamic world, imitators can provide benefit to both the original 
inventor and to society more generally. Patents may be desirable to encourage innovation in a 
static world, but they are less important in a sequential setting, where they may actually inhibit 
complementary innovation. 
The static-sequential distinction is more than just a theoretical nicety. Indeed, it may help 
resolve a puzzle emanating from the U. S. natural experiment in software patents.  Strikingly, the 
firms that obtained the most software patents (largely firms in the computer and electronics 
hardware industries) actually reduced their R&D spending relative to sales after patent 
protection was strengthened (Bessen and Hunt 2004). This behavior is difficult to reconcile with 
the static model, in which the prospect of patents should encourage R&D, but is quite consistent 
with the sequential model and specifically Proposition 7. 
Thus we would suggest a cautionary note about intellectual property protection. The 
reflexive view that “stronger is better” could well be too extreme; rather, a balanced approach 
seems called for. The ideal patent policy limits “knock-off” imitation, but allows developers who     35
make similar, but potentially valuable complementary contributions. In this sense, copyright 
protection for software programs (which has gone through its own evolution over the last 
decade) may have achieved a better balance than patent protection. In particular, industry 
participants complain that software patents have been too broad (and patented discoveries too 
obvious), leading to holdup problems [USPTO 1994, Oz 1998]. Systems that limit patent 
breadth, such as in the Japanese system before the late 1980’s, may offer a better balance.35  
Appendix A 
Proof that the Pareto distribution satisfies the Upper Tail Condition: 
The Pareto distribution is 
































0 , we see that, given k and v , the Pareto distribution satisfies the 
Upper Tail Condition for k and v  for all v in the defined domain, provided that α is small 






                                                      
35  In a review of the literature, Gallini and Scotchmer (2001) conclude, “Thus, with some caution, we can extract 
from the literature a case for broad (and short) patents. Broad patents can serve the public interest by preventing 
duplication of R&D costs, facilitating the development of second generation products, and protecting early 
innovators who lay a foundation for later innovators. However, these benefits disappear if licensing fails.” Our 
model establishes that broad patents may be especially harmful if licensing fails and that there is good reason to 
expect such a failure.     36
Proof that the lognormal distribution satisfies the Upper Tail Condition for values of v 
above the median: 
For the lognormal distribution with parameters μ and σ, 
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It is then straightforward to show that 
































, the lognormal distribution satisfies the Upper 
Tail Condition for all v above the median, given a large enough value of σ. 
Appendix B: Proofs of the Propositions 
Proposition 2: If the Upper Tail Condition holds for v  sufficiently big and k  sufficiently small, 
then expected net social welfare in the static model is higher with patent protection than without 
it. 
Proof: The expected difference in welfare between having patents and not having patents as this 
relates to firm 1’s participation is: 
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where the first integral in (A1) is negative because of overinvestment under patent protection 
(the fact that  11 vv
∗∗ ∗ < ) and the second integral is positive because of underinvestment without 
patent protection (the fact that  11 vv
∗ ∗∗∗ < ).  Summing the two integrals, we must show that for k 
small enough and v  big enough, 
(A2)     [] ()
1
1




∗∗ − ∫  
is positive, where  () ( ) 12 1 1 aq p qp p =+ − −.  We can rewrite (A2) as 
(A3)     ()( ) () () ( ) () () 11 1 1
11
11





∗∗ ∗∗ −− + − ∫∫ , 














, so that 
() 11 0 Fv
∗∗ =    and    ( ) 11 1 Fv
∗∗∗ = . 
To show that (A2) is positive, it suffices, from (A3), to show that 
(A4)     () ( ) 1
1
1




∗∗ −> ∫  
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(A5)     ()
1
1




∗∗ −> ∫ . 
  The left-hand side of (A5) can be rewritten as 
    () ( ) ( ) ()
22
11 1 1 2
a
vv c v v
∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ −− − () () 11 11 2
a
vv vvc
∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ⎡ ⎤ = −+ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 





∗∗∗ −= −>, we conclude that (A5) holds. 
  After integration by parts, the left-hand side of (A4) can be written as 
(A6)     () 11
1
1





∗∗ −−∫ . 
From the hypothesis of Proposition 2, we can choose k sufficiently small and v  sufficiently big 
that 
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From (A7), (A6) exceeds 
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which we already showed above to be positive.     39
  The expected difference in welfare between having patents and not having patents as this 
relates to firm 2’s participation is 
(A8)   () () () ( ) () () 21 21
22
22




∗∗ ∗ −− + −− ∫∫ , 
where the first integral in (A8) is negative because of overinvestment by firm 2 with patents (the 
fact that  22 vv
∗∗ ∗ < ) and the second is positive because of underinvestment by firm 2 without 
patents (the fact that  22 vv
∗ ∗∗∗ < ).  Summing the two integrals and dividing by q, we must show that 
(A9)   () () () 21
2
2




∗∗ −− ∫  
is positive for k sufficiently small and v  sufficiently big.  We can rewrite (A9) as 
(A10)        ()( ) () () () () () () () 2 2 21 2 2 21
22
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, so that 
   () 22 0 Fv
∗∗ =    and     ( ) 22 1 Fv
∗∗∗ = . 
To show that (A9) is positive, it suffices, from (A10), to show that 
(A11)     () () 21
2
2
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and 
(A12)     () () () 21 2
2
2




∗∗ −− > ∫ . 
The left-hand side of (A11) can be rewritten as 
() () ( ) ( ) ()
22 21
22 2 2 2
pp
vv c v v
∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ −
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  After integration by parts, the left-hand side of (A12) can be written as 
(A13)   () () ( ) 21 2 21 2
2
2





∗∗ −− − − ∫ . 
From hypothesis, we can choose k sufficiently small and v  sufficiently big so that 
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From (A14), (A13) exceeds     41




























which we know to be positive. 
  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3: In the static model, a firm undertaking R&D is (weakly) worse off if it has a 
competitor. 
Proof: When the firm has no competitor, its expected payoff is, depending on its cost, 
(A15)   1 p v   or    1 p vc − , 
If there is no patent protection and the firm faces a competitor, its payoff is 
   v sp1    or    c v sp − 1  when the other firm simply imitates 
or 
   2 sp v   or    2 sp v c −  when the other firm also invests, 
all of which are less than their counterparts in (A15).  If instead there is patent protection, then 
the firm’s payoff is (A15) when the other firm does not invest and      42
(A16)   1
2 2 p v   or    1
2 2 p vc −  when the other firm invests, 
which is each less than its counterpart in (A15). 
  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4: In the static model, a firm undertaking R&D is better off if there is patent 
protection than if there is no such protection. 




12 2 1 qp q p v c +− −  or  1
2 2 p vc − , 
depending on whether or not the other firm does too.  If instead there is no protection, the 
payoffs are 
() () 12 1 sqp s q p v c +− −  or  2 sp v c − . 
But 
() () ( ) ( )
11
12 2 2 12 22 11 s q p s q p v s pv pv q p q p v +− < < < +− , 
and so the firm is better off with patent protection. 
  Q.E.D.     43
Proposition 6: If the Upper Tail Condition holds for v  sufficiently big and k sufficiently small, 
then the likelihood of inefficiency in the sequential model without patents is lower than that in 
the static model without patents. 
Proof: The probability of inefficiency without patent protection in the static model is 
(A17)     () ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 22 Fv Fv Fv Fv
∗∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ −+ −, 
whereas that in the dynamic model is 
(A18)     () ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 22 Fv Fv Fv Fv −+ −
            . 
Now, from (2), (6), (12) and (14), 
(A19)     ()






qq p q p
∗ ∗∗∗ =
−−− −
       
If v  is sufficiently big and k sufficiently small, the Upper Tail Condition implies that 
()( ) 11 Fx v Fx v −








qq p q p
⎡ ⎤
∈⎢ ⎥
−−− − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.  Hence, we 
conclude from (A19) that 
(A20)     () ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 11 Fv Fv Fv Fv
∗∗ ∗ −>−
     . 
  Similarly, we have 
  () ()










pq p p s p p
∗∗ ∗ ⎛⎞ −+ −
= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −+ − − ⎝⎠
  ,     44
And so, from the Upper Tail Condition, we obtain 
   () ( )





12 cpq p p
Fv Fv F Fv
sp p
∗∗ ∗ ⎛⎞ −+ −
−> − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
   
(A21) 
      () ( ) 22 Fv Fv >−
     . 
Hence from (A20) and (A21), (A17) is bigger than (A18). 
  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 7: If the Upper Tail Condition holds for v  sufficiently big and k sufficiently small, 
then there exists  0 q >  such that, expected net social welfare in the dynamic model is higher in 
equilibrium without patent protection than in equilibrium with such protection provided that 
qq < . 
Proof: For q near enough 0, we have, from (12)-(15), (18)-(20), and (23) 
   .5 .75 1.5 1 2 1 2 2 v vvv v vvv <<= < <<<
                       . 
Hence, the expected difference in welfare between having patents and not having patents is 
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. 
It will suffice to show that there exists A > 0 such that, for q sufficiently near 0, (22) is less than 
–A. 
 As  0 q → , the integrands of the first four integrals of (A22) tend to zero.  Furthermore, 
.5 .75 1.5 1 2 , , , , and  vvvv v
                 all tend to finite limits.  Hence, the first four integrals all tend to zero as 
0 q → .  Now, the fifth integral can be written as 
   () ( ) () () ( ) () () 22 2
22
22
, Fv Fv a v bd F v Fv a v bd v
vv
vv
∗ −+ + + ∫∫
          
     
         
where 
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   ()
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Hence, it suffices to show that there exist D > 0 and E > 0 such that 
(A23)   ()
2
2





     
(A24)   () ( )
2
2
av b dF v E
v
v
∗ +< − ∫
  
     
for q near enough 0.  The left-hand side of (A23) can be rewritten as 
(A25)   ()( ) ( )
22
22 2 2 .
2
a
vv b v v ⎡⎤ −+ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
               
Because 
































the limit of (A25) as  0 is -  q →∞ , and so (A23) holds.  The left-hand side of (A24) can be 
rewritten as 
(A27)   () 2
2
2






    .     47
For k small enough and v  big enough, the Upper Tail Condition ensures that 
(A28)   () ()
22





≤−+ ⎜⎟ −− − ⎝⎠
       
                     . 
From (A28), (A27) is no greater than 




av b v v +− + +
   
           
    2 2
a
vb =+
   , 
and from (A26), the limit of the right-hand side of (A29) as  0 q →  is 









and so (A24) holds. 
  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 8: If the Upper Tail Condition holds for v  sufficiently big and k sufficiently small, 
than each firm’s ex ante expected profit in the dynamic model is higher in equilibrium without 
patent protection than in equilibrium with protection, provided that q is sufficiently small and s 
is near enough 1
2 .   
Proof: Following the argument in the proof of Proposition 7, we can express the difference in 
firm 1’s payoff between equilibrium with and without patents, assuming q is sufficiently small, 
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 As  0 q → , the integrads of the first four integrals of (A30) tend to zero and 
.5 .75 1.5 1 ,,,, vvvv
              and  2 v
    tend to finite limits, as in the proof of Proposition 7.  Hence, as in that 
proof, the first four integrals all tend to zero as  0 q → .  Furthermore, for s near  1
2 , the fifth 
integral is about half that of its counterpart in (A22).  Hence, by the same logic as in the previous 
proof, (A30) is negative, given the hypotheses. 
  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 9: Assume that the Upper Tail Condition holds forv  sufficiently big and k 
sufficiently small and that     49












If s is near enough  1
2 , then in the sequential model a firm gains from having a competitor and 
being imitated, whether or not there is patent protection 
Proof: If a firm has no competitor, its payoff for v big enough is 








By contrast in two-firm equilibria with and without patents, a firm’s payoffs, for v big enough, 
are, respectively, 



























 for s near  1
2 .  Hence, for v big enough, (A32) and 
(A33) are bigger than (A31).  We conclude that for k small enough and v  big enough, a firm’s 
equilibrium payoff with competition is bigger than that without competition. 
  Q.E.D. 
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Figure 1. Static Model – R&D thresholds for high-cost firms 
Figure 2. Dynamic Model – R&D thresholds for high-cost firms 
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